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Public key Kerberos (PKINIT) is a standard authentication and key
establishment protocol. Unfortunately, it suffers from a security flaw when
combined with smart cards. In particular, temporary access to a user’s
card enables an adversary to impersonate that user for an indefinite period
of time, even after the adversary’s access to the card is revoked. In this
paper, we extend Shoup’s key exchange security model to the smart card
setting, and examine PKINIT in this model. Using this formalization, we
show that PKINIT is indeed flawed, propose a fix, and provide a proof
that this fix leads to a secure protocol.
1 Introduction
It is well known that human users can be authenticated based on something they
know (e.g. a password), something they have (e.g. a smart card), or some part of
themselves (e.g. a fingerprint). Unfortunately, possession-based authentication
systems are more complex and costly to implement, deploy, and maintain than
knowledge-based authentication systems. This is because, while the user’s mind
operates as the secure storage place for his password in a knowledge-based sys-
tem, in a possession-based system hardware tokens and special software must be
manufactured and managed. Analyzing the security of systems that are based
on hardware tokens is also more challenging because security-critical functions
are performed both by the user’s terminal and the token itself (see [24] for a
detailed discussion of the implications of this situation). Moreover, hardware
tokens are often protected by a Personal Identification Number (PIN); while this
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potentially leads to stronger security, often called ‘two-factor authentication’, it
complicates the security analysis further.
Another complicating factor, which is often overlooked, is that users may share
their tokens just as they share their passwords, even if explicitly told to not do
so [26]. We assume the following mental model with respect to sharing. While
a user will change his password in order to revoke the rights from those with
whom the password was shared, a user that wishes to revoke the rights from
those with whom his token was shared, simply retrieves his token and keeps it
at a safe place. Possession-based authentication system propagate exactly this
mental model, and, therefore, must guarantee that non-possession of the token
leads to the inability to authenticate.
A possession-based authentication system should also take into account the
threat of an adversary that compromises the user’s terminal. Assuming that
the token communicates through the terminal, such a compromise affects all
users, irrespective of whether or not they share their tokens with others. A
compromised terminal, in addition from capturing the user’s PIN, may engage
in a large number of illegitimate communications with the token. Unless the
token has some mechanism to alarm the user, such an attack cannot be detected.
In addition to authenticating users, token-based authentication systems are also
used to establish session keys between the user’s terminal and a remote server.
These keys, which are used to protect the communication between the user and
the server, must be secret, even to someone who had previously access to the to-
ken. The system must therefore protect these keys from threats they are exposed
to whenever the token is within an adversarial environment (e.g. an adversary
temporarily ‘borrowed’ the token, or compromised the user’s terminal).
In order to address the above threats, we argued in [19] about the need of
certain protocol properties for token-based authentication and key establishment
systems. The following two properties ensure that this temporary compromise,
does not lead to the ability for an adversary to impersonate users or servers
outside the time window of the compromise.
• SC1 key-compromise impersonation: An adversary that accessed a user’s
token, should not be able to impersonate other entities to that user, as
long as the user uses a non-corrupted terminal.
• Possession-based authentication: An adversary with access to a user’s
token, should be able to impersonate that user only for as long as it has
access to the token.
The following two properties ensure the secrecy of past and future sessions.
• SC perfect forward secrecy: Session keys that were established with a user’s
token over a non-corrupted terminal remain secret, even if an adversary
later obtains access to that user’s token.
1The SC acronym can be interpreted as smart card.
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• SC backward secrecy: Session keys that are established with a user’s token
over a non-corrupted terminal remain secret, even if an adversary had
previously accessed the user’s token.
These properties complement the list of the desirable properties for secure com-
munications protocol put forward in [7].
The focus of this paper is the possession-based authentication system that arises
when using the Diffie-Hellman (DH) variant of public key Kerberos [30] with
smart cards. While there are various types of smart cards, we consider unclon-
able smart cards without a keypad that provide operations on their stored keys
without exposing them. That is, in our model the adversary is unable to extract
long-term secrets from the card.
The informal examination in [19] shows that, unfortunately, this variant of Ker-
beros does not provide the property of possession-based authentication; an ad-
versary that has temporary access to a user’s smart card at some point in
time, can impersonate that user for an indefinite period of time. In this paper,
we formalize this work. In particular, we extend Shoup’s key exchange secu-
rity model [27] to the smart card setting, and examine PKINIT in this model.
Based on this, we show that PKINIT is indeed flawed and provide a proof that
a similar to the proposed fix in [19] leads to a secure protocol.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section overviews related
work and Section 3 revisits the PKINIT protocol. The attack and a fix is
described in Section 4. Section 5 revisits Shoup’s static corruptions model [27]
and presents our extended version of the model. This extended version accounts
for the presence of smart cards in the context of key establishment protocols.
Section 6 applies the model to the original and the fixed PKINIT protocols.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Related work
Several models, such as the BAN logic [9, 17], process calculus-based logics [13],
and complexity theory analysis techniques (e.g. [4]) capture protocol security
guarantees on authentication and key exchange. The adversary they consider
is typically a Dolev-Yao-style adversary [16], i.e., is assumed to control the
entire network. The PKINIT protocol, including its Diffie-Hellman variant, has
already been proven secure under that adversary model [2, 8, 12, 23].
However, the Dolev-Yao model does not consider adversaries with attack abil-
ities such as temporary access to a user’s card. That is, the models used for
the PKINIT protocol verification do not capture attacks that involve temporary
smart card access. More generally, their positive results of protocol verification
do not carry over to the smart card setting.
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Despite the fact that smart cards have been introduced to a multitude of proto-
cols, to the best of our knowledge, only few works provide formal treatments of
smart card-based protocols against an adversary that is able to attack a user’s
terminal independently from his smart card (see, for example, [3, 10, 11, 28]).
In the following paragraphs we provide an overview of the existing methods and
their limitations.
2.1 BAN logic
Abadi et al. enhanced BAN logic [9] to account for smart card related threats
in [10]. The BAN logic is a logic of beliefs that is used to prove certain properties
in authentication protocols. The smart card extension is the first known formal
treatment of smart card threats written in time where the notion of a smart card
was not clearly defined. As such the protocols that are studied vary from smart
cards that resemble the features of a modern smart card, to smart cards that
include batteries (to maintain a clock), screen and keypad. The adversaries they
consider are the typical Dolev-Yao network adversary, but include the abilities
for smart card theft and terminal compromise. The latter is a main concern
of the study, possibly because it was written in a time where smart cards were
simple containers of data that were read by the terminal, and the authors cope
with it explicitly by including terminal verification in the studied protocols. In
their model, the user and the smart card are different entities that share a secret
(the PIN). The original logic is enhanced with a notion for secure channels and
the notion of timely channel (a channel which was established recently), and
this logic is being used to verify and prove correct delegation-based protocols,
i.e., protocols that allow delegation of authority such as the user’s card signing
the terminal’s credentials for certain time to authorize the terminal to act on
his behalf.
Its applicability on protocols that do not involve delegation (i.e., most modern
protocols) is limited.
2.2 The Shoup-Rubin game-based method
Shoup and Rubin proposed a game-based model to capture the usage of smart
cards with symmetric keys in key distribution protocols involving a trusted
party [28]. The threat model in [28] is a static corruptions model extended to
model smart card theft, terminal tampering, etc. It is one of the first works
to discuss the security implications and gains of using smart cards to protect
cryptographic keys. The formal model used is similar to the Bellare and Rog-
away model [5], which assumes a security parameter, a number of hosts n, and
a trusted server S. Each host is given a smart card with long-term key K1≤i≤n
and S is given key K. The smart card is modeled as a stateless probabilistic
oracle. On input x it returns f(k, x). Each host i may communicate with a host
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j by using a process II(i, j, u), where u is a process identifier to allow more than
one connection. The adversary is a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm that
initializes and interacts with the system. The interaction is a queries/answer
based communication with the processes and the server. The “transcript” is a
list that contains the queries and answers ordered in time. The allowed queries
to a process are delivery of a message, and response, as well as three special
queries (1) for a process to reveal its session key, and (2) for a smart card to
reveal its long-term key and (3) to access an operation of the smart card oracle.
If the latter special queries are used, the process or the smart card are consid-
ered to be opened. During the interaction each process may output a message
indicating acceptance which indicates that a session key was established.
The Shoup-Rubin verification approach is used to verify three-party protocols
using long-term symmetric keys. While its main game-based idea can be ex-
tended to accomodate two-party protocols as well, and even protocols using
asymmetric primitives, it is not clear whether such an extension will result to
an easy to use model that allows simple proofs.
2.3 Inductive verification
Bella uses the mathematical induction as the main tool to prove the proto-
col’s security goals with respect to smart cards that protect symmetric keys [3].
The possible threats are modeled as a set of events, defined by inductive rules.
The security goals are then proved using induction on the set. The an adver-
sary model is similar to the one of Shoup-Rubin, with an additionally modeled
threat which the author calls “data bus failure”. This threat models smart card
tampering in a way that messages from the card to the reader are modified or
removed. The author then models the Shoup-Rubin protocol in [28] and uses
the ‘Isabelle’ tool [22] to prove its security claims.
As with the Shoup-Rubin verification approach, inductive verification is used
with long-term symmetric keys. An extension of it for asymmetric primitives
would require a non-trivial modification of the model.
2.4 Resettable zero knowledge
Canetti et al. introduce the notion of resettable zero knowledge (rZK) [11]. This
notion expresses an improvement over the classical notion of zero knowledge.
Protocols under rZK remain secure even after a prover is reset to its initial state
and re-uses the same random numbers. The resetting property in this notion
is of particular importance to certain smart cards (e.g., smart cards that do
not support atomic updates) due to their nature of being under the complete
control of the adversary. A protocol that satisfies the rZK definitions is suitable
for a cryptographic protocol that utilizes smart cards.
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That notion while it may be interesting for the design of future protocols that
target certain types of smart cards, it does not apply to any existing protocols
that do not involve algorithms that satisfy strong notions such as (resettable)
zero knowledge.
2.5 Our approach
In this paper we enhance Shoup’s simulatability-based static corruptions model [27]
to account for threats in a typical key establishment protocol arising from smart
card usage. That is, we extend Shoup’s model to incorporate the relevant to
smart cards threats of the models above. This results in a model that can be
used to verify any two-party key exchange protocol with symmetric or asym-
metric keys.
Under this model we prove the modified PKINIT protocol secure. The notion of
security in this model depends on an ideal system, with an ideal key exchange
that is by definition secure and a real system that describes the actual protocol
and participant interactions. A proof of security in this model shows that any
attack on the real system can be simulated in the ideal system. We use this
model because it is dedicated to key exchange, and, as such not only suffices for
our purposes, but has the advantage of making this work relevant to all two-
party secure communications protocols. Furthermore, due to its composition
properties [27], it is a suitable tool to study protocol components in isolation.
3 Overview of the DH variant of PKINIT
Kerberos is an authentication and key distribution protocol originally proposed
in 1988, and has a long history of attacks and updates (see, for example, [2, 12]
and the references therein). Its main goal is to establish fresh session keys be-
tween users and servers and, as a result, enable users to log into multiple servers
that belong to a common infrastructure. To this end, a user first requests an
electronic ‘ticket’ from a central Key Distribution Center (KDC). The ticket
then enables authenticated users to log into a server that is part of the infras-
tructure.
The main characteristic of all Kerberos variants, as well as the main difference
with other Internet security protocols like TLS [15] or IPSec [18], is a single
round-trip message exchange between the client and the KDC. This short mes-
sage exchange is insufficient to provide any kind of freshness indication in the
client message due to the lack of any prior input from the server, but it is
handled by including a client-generated timestamp to ensure freshness (despite
early arguments against that [6]). Replays in this exchange are prevented by
requiring the server to store the client generated nonce during the validity time
of the timestamp.
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Figure 1: The DH variant of public key Kerberos with smart card (simplified).
Fig. 1 provides a high-level overview of the DH of PKINIT as specified in [21, 30]
and specifically its variant where each party generates a fresh pair of DH keys.
When the user decides to log into a server (step 0 in the Figure) his terminal
constructs an AS REQ message as specified in [21] and then computes its hash
value h. Then it chooses a DH group, randomly generates an ephemeral DH
secret x ∈ Zp, and computes g
x, where p is a large prime and g is the generator
of the group. In that process the terminal chooses the 32-bit nonces n1, n2 and
stores the current time τ . It then provides the values gx, n1, n2, τ and h to the
smart card for signing (step 1). Note that, depending on the implementation,
it may only provide a hash of these values to the smart card. If the smart card
is PIN-enabled, then the user must provide his PIN prior to this operation.
Depending on the implementation, the PIN is inserted either to the terminal or
the smart card reader. Fig. 1 shows the case where the user provides his PIN
to the terminal in step 0, and where this is sent to the card in step 1.
The signature σ, output by the smart card (step 2), is then used by the termi-
nal to construct an augmented version of the AS REQ message, which we denote
by AS REQ∗. This message, which contains gx, n1, n2, τ, σ and AS REQ as a sub-
structure, is sent to the KDC (step 3) which, among other things, verifies the
signature. If verification succeeds, then the KDC chooses a random y ∈ Zp, com-
putes gy and the ephemeral secret K = F (gxy, n1), and constructs a response
AS REP. This message contains a ticket which is encrypted with K. Finally, it
augments this message with fields containing the values of gy and n1 signed
with server’s private key. The resulting message, denoted AS REP∗, is sent to
the terminal (step 4).
Using the value gy and its ephemeral secret x, the terminal recovers the key K
and is therefore able to decrypt the ticket. This ticket enables the terminal
to complete the subsequent message exchange with the desired server (step 5).
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The details of this exchange are not relevant to the attack. A more detailed
view of the key exchange is shown below.
User → KDC : τ, IDServer, n1, n2, g, p, g
x, certUser,
sigUser(τ, n1, n2, g, p, g
x, IDKDC)
KDC → User : gy, IDUser, certKDC, sigKDC(g
y, n1),
{n2, IDServer,KServer}K
where K = F (gxy, n1), F is a hash function based on SHA1 and KServer is the
key shared between the client and the server.
4 Attack and fix
This section revisits the attack on the PKINIT protocol as described in [19] and
proposes a fix.
4.1 The attack
This protocol naturally lends itself to an implementation where the user’s private
signing key is stored in a smart card and indeed, PKINIT is typically used with
smart cards in the Microsoft Windows Active Directory [14, 20]. However, in
the combined protocol, there are three types of players: users, servers and a
central entity called the Key Distribution Center (KDC). A user is equipped
with a terminal and a smart card. The card contains an asymmetric key pair
and a certificate, signed by an authority, that binds the public key to the user’s
identity. Moreover, the card provides an interface over which the terminal can
ask the card to sign messages using the private key. Note that the card may
require a PIN in order to respond to signature requests from the terminal.
Careful inspection of the smart card deployment documentation for Kerberos [14,
20] reveals a flaw, which arises due to the smart card introduction. This flaw
leads to a relatively trivial attack, that enables an adversary with only tem-
porary access to a victim’s smart card, to impersonate the victim even after
the adversary’s access to the card is revoked. The attack is based on the ob-
servation that the KDC has no means to verify whether or not an incoming
AS REQ∗ message is fresh. That is, while the KDC checks that the timestamp τ
indicates approximate current time, this does not guarantee that the AS REQ∗
message was constructed recently. In fact, the AS REQ∗ message could have been
generated in the distant past.
In order to mount the attack, the adversary first obtains access to a victim’s
smart card. This can be done either by compromising the victim’s terminal,
or by stealing the card and its PIN. The adversary then fabricates an AS REQ
message, calculates its hash h, chooses nonces n1, n2, a random DH secret x,
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and a timestamp τ indicating a particular future point in time. It then sends
the values gx, τ, n1, n2, and h to the card to obtain the signature σ. Using this
signature, the adversary constructs an AS REQ∗ message.
This fabricated AS REQ∗ message will be accepted by the KDC as a genuine
ticket request from the victim at time indicated by τ . Since neither the victim’s
himself, nor his smart card is required in the remainder of the protocol, the
message enables the adversary to impersonate the victim to the KDC at time
τ . With the ticket in the KDC’ response, the adversary will further be able to
impersonate the victim to the server of his choice until the ticket expires.
Note that, in order to be able to impersonate a victim at, say, approximately
20:00 of every Monday in a two-year period, the adversary must fabricate about
104 AS REQ∗ messages as described above and, for each such message, obtain a
signature from the card. In other words, a few minutes of access to a victim’s
card are sufficient for the adversary to be able to impersonate the victim, on a
regular basis, for years.
4.2 The fix
A fix that defends against the attack at the cost of an additional message is de-
scribed below. In this paper, we refer to the resulting fixed protocol as ‘modified
PKINIT’. In modified PKINIT, the KDC first sends a nonce n0 to the terminal.
This nonce is then added to the data signed by the smart card and included
in AS REQ∗ (see step 1 in Fig. 1). On reception of the AS REQ∗ message, the
KDC also ensures that the signature covers n0. Apart from the message from
the KDC to the client that transports the nonce, and a change to the AS REQ∗
message to accommodate the additional nonce. The resulting protocol is shown
below.
KDC → User : n0
User → KDC : τ, IDServer, n1, n2, g, p , g
x, certUser,
sigUser(τ, n0, n1, n2, g, p, g
x, IDKDC)
KDC → User : gy, certKDC, sigKDC(IDUser, g
x, gy, n1),
{n2, IDServer,KServer}K
where K = F (gxy, n1) and F is a hash function based on SHA1.
Note however, that the fact that the protocol’s initial message is sent by the
server does not imply that this is no longer a client-initiated protocol. There are
examples of client-initiated protocols where the server is sending the first session
message, e.g., the SSH [29] protocol. Of course depending on the underlying
transport layer an additional initial client message may be required to initiate
the session.
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An important note on the fix presented here, is the addition of gx and IDUser
values to the signature value of the KDC. The original signature only contained
the public parameter of the server and the client’s nonce, making it applicable
to a variety of sessions unrelated to this one that may share the same nonce (not
an unlikely scenario given that this nonce is only 32-bits long). That weakness
was first noted by Roy et al. [23] who nevertheless proved the security of the
original scheme on the random oracle model, relying on the key derivation using
the F function. However, the disassociation of a server-generated signature with
the session that it was intended to be used, would in effect turn the server into
a signing oracle, which is a known bad practice [1]. For this reason, we include
these additional values in our modified version, a fact that also simplifies the
study of the protocol and our later proofs.
4.3 Other possible fixes
The fix described above allows the re-use, for the purposes of Kerberos, of
commonly available smart cards. These cards typically operate by signing any
provided data or hash values by the terminal without interpreting them. On
the other hand, the fix increases the protocol latency by an additional round-
trip. If this is undesirable, alternative solutions may be possible at the cost,
however, of requiring PKINIT-specific smart cards. That is, smart cards that
interpret the data send by the terminal for signing. Examples are smart cards
that would allow time to only go forward [25], effectively blocking the user’s
card if under the described attack, or smart cards with an internal clock that
would set their time to the signed data. Another possible fix would be to obtain
the initial nonce from the server through a layering violation. For example, in
case of Kerberos over TCP, set the nonce to match the TCP sequence number
used by the server.
These fixes, however, come at the cost of more expensive or specialized smart
cards, or in the case of a layering violation, result in a protocol that can only
be implemented in certain specific cases. For that, we will not consider them in
this document any further.
5 A model for static corruptions with smart cards
This section describes the security model in which we analyze PKINIT and the
fix. Our model is an extension of Shoup’s model for session key establishment
protocols [27] to the smart card setting. Note that we choose to extend the
‘static corruptions’ variant of Shoup’s model, and that we omit certain options
that are not relevant for our arguments in this paper. For a complete description
of all variants of Shoup’s model the reader is referred to [27].
The security model is based on simulatability of the real world within an ideal
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world. That is, protocols that are secure in this model behave ‘as if’ the interac-
tions between participates would take place in the ideal world. This ideal world
is part of the model’s definition and captures what it means for the protocol to
be secure.
More specifically, security is defined by means of a ‘game’, i.e., a series of inter-
actions, between an adversary and a ‘ring master’. The purpose of this game,
which takes place either in the ‘real world’ or in the ‘ideal world’, is the genera-
tion of a transcript. In the ideal world, the interactions between the adversary
and the ring master cause protocol instances to be initialized, session keys to be
generated and assigned to these instances, keys to be revealed, etc. However,
in the ideal world, these protocol instances are ‘virtual’ because no security
protocol is ever executed (and hence no protocol messages are ever exchanged);
session keys are instead generated by the ring master, and information about
these keys can be leaked to the adversary exclusively over well-defined interac-
tions.
In the real world, the adversary also interacts with the ring master. In this world,
however, the ring master controls ‘real’ protocol participants that execute the
actual protocol. Session keys are indeed established by real protocol instances,
and the only way for the adversary to drive these instances, is by means of
sending protocol messages to the ring master. These messages are forwarded by
the ring master to the protocol instances chosen by the adversary, and responses
are forwarded to the adversary.
In both worlds, the adversary causes protocol events to occur, i.e., session keys
to be established, sessions to be aborted, keys to be revealed, etc. These events
are written to a transcript. The security definition requires that all real-world
adversaries are ‘simulatable’ in the ideal world. That is, adversaries that in-
teract, through the ring master, with real protocol participants, must not be
able to cause a series of events that is impossible to be caused by an adversary
that operates in ideal world which, by definition, is secure. Whether or not this
‘simulatability’ requirement is fulfilled, is verified by means of a ‘distinguisher’.
This distinguisher is given a transcript that originates from an adversary/ring
master game, and must decide whether the game took place in the ideal or the
real world. Only if the distinguisher has no advantage over random guessing is
the protocol considered secure.
5.1 The ideal world
As explained above, in the ideal world, the adversary interacts with the ring
master by means of different queries, defined below. During this interaction, the
ring master creates state for ‘users’ and ‘user instances’, denoted by Ui and Ii,j ,
respectively, where i, j ∈ N. The state associated with users and user instances is
generated during this interaction. While the state associated with users models
participants that may execute a given session key establishment protocol, the
11
state associated with user instances models individual executions the protocol.
User instances must be ‘initialized’ before they can establish session keys. The
ring master associates with every initialized instance a particular state; possible
states are active, isolated and finished. The ring master may also reject certain
queries; whenever this happens, the adversary has violated some consistency
constraint which renders the particular query to be illegal.
The purpose of the adversary’s interaction with the ring master is the generation
of a transcript, i.e., a sequence of entries. Initially, the transcript is empty. The
queries the adversary may issue during the game are as follows.
• InitUser(i, ID): On reception of this query where ID is a bit string, the
ring master rejects the query if there exists an (InitUser(i, ·)) entry in the
transcript. Otherwise, it assigns the identifier ID to Ui and appends the
entry (InitUser, i, ID) to the transcript. No information is returned to the
adversary.
• InitUserInstance(i, j, role,PID): On reception of this query where role ∈
{0, 1} and PID is a bit string, the ring master rejects the query if the
transcript does not contain any (InitUser, i, ·) entry, or if it contains an
(InitUserInstance, i, j, ·, ·) entry. Otherwise, it sets the instance to be
active, and assigns to it the role role and the partner identifier PID to the
instance. This partner identifier is to be seen as the identifier of the user
with which this instance shall expect to establish a session key. The ring
master then appends the entry (InitUserInstance, i, j, role,PID) to the
transcript, and no information is returned to the adversary. Note that the
role role breaks symmetry and can be seen as an indicator of whether the
instance should behave as a client or server (equivalently, as an initiator
or a responder).
Remark 1: Two instances may be ‘compatible’ with respect to a transcript.
Informally, we say that instances are ‘compatible’ if they expect to establish a
session key with each other. Formally, two instances Ii,j and Ii′,j′ are said to
be compatible with respect to a transcript, if there exist entries (InitUser, i, ID),
(InitUser, i′, ID′), (InitUserInstance, i, j, role,PID), and (InitUserInstance,
i′, j′, role′,PID′) such that role 6= role′, ID = PID′, and ID′ = PID.
• AccessSC(i): On reception of this query, the ring master rejects the query
if the transcript does not contain any (InitUser, i, ·) entry. Otherwise, it
appends the entry (AccessSC, i) to the transcript.
Remark 2: Note that AccessSC(i) is only a placeholder in the ideal world.
The idea behind it is to simulate unauthorized access to smart cards, and its
purpose is to enable the compromise mode in the Start query (see below).
• Abort(i, j): On reception of this query, the ring master rejects the query
if there exists no (InitUserInstance, i, j, ·, ·) entry in the transcript. Oth-
erwise, it appends the entry (Abort, i, j) to the transcript and sets Ii,j to
be finished. No information is returned to the adversary.
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• Start(i, j,mode[,key]): On reception of this query, where mode ∈ {create,
connect(i′, j′), compromise} and key is a bit string, the ring master re-
jects the query if there exists no (InitUserInstance, i, j, ·, ·) entry in the
transcript, or if Ii,j is finished. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows.
– If mode = create, then the ring master generates a key Ki,j uniformly
at random, assigns it to Ii,j , sets Ii,j to be isolated, and appends the
entry (Start, i, j) to the transcript. No information is returned to the
adversary.
– If mode = connect(i′, j′), then the ring master rejects the query if
the two instances Ii,j and Ii′,j′ are not compatible. The ring master
further rejects the query if the instance Ii′,j′ is not isolated. The ring
master then assigns the key Ki′,j′ , which was previously assigned
to Ii′,j′ , to the instance Ii,j . Finally, the ring master sets both Ii,j
and Ii′,j′ to be finished, and appends the entry (Start, i, j) to the
transcript. No information is returned to the adversary.
– If mode = compromise, then the adversary must also specify the
parameter key. On reception of this query, the ring master rejects
the query if there exists no (InitUserInstance, i, j, ·, ·) entry in the
transcript. Otherwise, it selects this entry. The ring master then
checks whether or not Ii,j has compatible instances. If it has, then
the ring master checks whether or not the first (InitUserInstance,
i′, j′, ·, ·) entry, where Ii′,j′ is a compatible instance, appears before
the selected entry. If it does, then the ring master deselects the
(InitUserInstance, i, j, ·,PID) entry selected above and selects this
(InitUserInstance, i′, j′, ·, ·) entry instead. The ring master then
checks whether or not the peer’s the smart card was illegitimately
accessed after the instance that was initialized first, was initialized.
That is, the ring master checks whether or not the transcript contains
an (AccessSC, i′) entry after the entry selected above. If not, then
the ring master rejects the query.
Finally, the ring master then checks whether or not the identifier PID
corresponds to an initialized user, i.e., if there exists an (InitUser, ·,
ID′) such that PID = ID′; if it does, then the ring master also rejects
the query. If the query is not rejected, then the ring master assigns
the key key to the instance Ii,j , sets the instance to be finished, and
appends the entry (Start, i, j) to the transcript. No information is
returned to the adversary.
Remark 3: In simpler words the ring master accepts the Start with mode =
compromise query only when the peer is not an assigned user or if AccessSC
has been issued on the peer after any of the current or the peer’s instance have
been initialized.
• Application(f): On reception of this query, where f is the description
of a function that takes as parameters a string and a set of keys, the
13
ring master evaluates f on input the string R and the set of keys {Ki,j}
that have been assigned to instances during the game so far. The ring
master appends the entry (Application, f, f(R, {Ki,j})) to the transcript
and returns the value f(R, {Ki,j}) to the adversary.
• Implementation(comment): On reception of this query, where comment is
a bit string, the ring master appends the entry (Implementation, comment)
to the transcript. No information is returned to the adversary.
Remark 4: To capture the threats of adversaries with temporary access to
smart cards, the capabilities of the ideal world adversary are extended com-
pared to the ‘static corruptions’ variant of Shoup’s model [27]. The idea of our
extension is that the adversary may explicitly access a participant’s smart card
by means of the AccessSC query. An adversary that causes an ongoing peer
session to accept by doing so after the session was initialized, is considered be-
nign in our model. This follows the intuition that, as long as an adversary has
illegitimate access to a victim’s smart card, it is no surprise if the victim can be
impersonated. An adversary that causes a peer instance to accept without ac-
cessing the participant’s smart card while their session is ongoing, on the other
hand, this considered malicious. The distinction between these two adversary
types is captured by the consistency constraints that the ring master enforces
on reception of a Start(·, ·, compromise, ·) query. Note that modifying the con-
straints that apply to ‘compromise’ queries follows the general approach of the
Shoup-Rubin model [28].
5.2 The real world
Unlike in the the ideal world, users and user instances are not simply placehold-
ers in the real world. Instead, users correspond to real participants in a given
session key establishment protocol, and are given long-term cryptographic keys
and smart cards. User instances are probabilistic Turing machines that are acti-
vated for a particular execution of the protocol. As such, they accept messages
and, for each incoming message, they output another message as well as a status
indication from the following set.
• continue: The instance expects at least one more message.
• accept: The instance is finished and a session key has been established.
• reject: The user instance is finished without having established a session
key.
Apart from users and user instances, in the real world there also exists a trusted
third party (TTP). This TTP may operate off-line and has a public/private key
pair. Users are required to register with this TTP before their instances can
establish session keys. As in the ideal world, an adversary interacts with the ring
master for the purposes of generating a transcript. The queries the adversary
may issue to the ring master, are as follows.
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• InitUser(i, ID): On reception of this query where ID is a bit string, the ring
master rejects the query if there exists an (InitUser, i, ·) or an (Implemen-
tation, register, ·, ·, ·) entry in the transcript. Otherwise, Ui is registered
with the TTP, his long term state is generated and his smart card is per-
sonalized and given to him. The ring master appends the entry (InitUser,
i, ID) to the transcript, and no information is returned to the adversary.
• Register(i, ID, request): On reception of this query where ID and request
are bit strings, the ring master rejects the query if there exists an (InitUser,
i, ·) or an (Implementation, register, ·, ·, ·) entry in the transcript. Oth-
erwise, it forwards request to the TTP, which registers the identity ID,
and generates a response response. The ring master then appends the en-
try (Implementation, register, ID, request, response) to the transcript, and
returns response to the adversary.
• InitUserInstance(i, j, role,PID): On reception of this query where role ∈
{0, 1} and PID is a bit string, the ring master rejects the query if the
transcript does not contain any (InitUser, i, ·) entry, or if it contains an
(InitUserInstance, i, j, ·, ·) entry. Otherwise, it sets the instance to be
active, assigns to it the role role and the partner identifier PID to the
instance, and appends the entry (InitUserInstance, i, j, role,PID) to the
transcript. No information is returned to the adversary.
• DeliverMessage(i, j, inMsg): On reception of this query where inMsg is
a bit string, the ring master rejects the query if the transcript does not
contain any (InitUserInstance, i, j, ·, ·) entry. Otherwise, it sends the
message inMsg to instance Ii,j . After processing this message, the in-
stance outputs the message outMsg and the status τ . The ring master
appends the entry (Implementation, deliverMsg, i, j, inMsg, outMsg, τ) to
the transcript. If τ 6= continue, the ring master sets Ii,j to be finished.
If τ = accept, the ring master also appends the entry (Start, i, j) to the
transcript; if τ = reject, it appends the entry (Abort, i, j) instead. Finally,
the ring master returns outMsg to the adversary.
• AccessSC(i, request): On reception of this query where request is a bit
string, the ring master rejects the query if the transcript does not con-
tain any (InitUser, i, ·) entry. Otherwise, it sends request to Ui’s smart
card. After processing this message, the smart card outputs the re-
sponse response. The ring master appends the entries (Implementation,
accessSC, i, request, response) and (AccessSC, i) to the transcript. Finally,
the ring master returns response to the adversary.
• Application(f): On reception of this query, the ring master proceeds as in
the ideal world, with the exception that the set of keys {Ki,j} refer to the
keys that were actually established by the protocol.
Note that there exists no Implementation query in the real world. We are now
ready to state the soundness and security definitions.
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Definition 1. A smart card-based protocol is efficient and sound if real world
user instances terminate after a polynomially bounded number of incoming mes-
sages, and, whenever the adversary faithfully delivers the generated messages be-
tween two compatible user instances, these instances accept and share the same
session key.
Definition 2. A smart card-based protocol is secure if for every efficient real
world adversary, there exists an ideal world adversary that generates a compu-
tationally indistinguishable transcript.
Remark 5: In order to maintain the generality of our model, we did not
introduce entities in the real world definition that are specific to PKINIT. While
the key distribution server (KDC) is such an entity, it is handled just as another
user that may also possess a smart card. While it is not mandatory that all
users have smart cards, this approach naturally covers situations where the
KDC stores its keys in a hardware security module (which operates similarly to
a smart card).
Remark 6: Note that even though the PKINIT protocol has the notion of time
and timestamps, they are not needed in the model. The “time” in the real or
ideal world can be assumed to be given by a numeration of the transcript.
6 Results
This section presents our results, namely that PKINIT is not secure in the model
described in Section 5, and that the fix proposed in [19] is. Our proof assumes
that the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard, that the used
signature scheme is unforgeable, and the random oracle model.2
Theorem 1. The PKINIT key exchange with smart cards is not secure.
Proof. This proof is an application of the distinguishing approach described
in point 5 of section 3.4 in [27]. Consider the real world transcript shown in
Fig. 2. According to entries 1 and 2, the adversary first initializes two users,
10 and 20, with identifiers ‘Alice’ and ‘KDC’, respectively. The adversary then
accesses Alice’s smart card in order to obtain the signature signature on the
structure signedData. The adversary chooses signedData such that the concate-
nation signedData||signature yields the fabricated AS REQ∗ message described in
Section 4.1. The adversary afterwards initializes an instance 200 for the KDC
(see entry 5). Subsequently, the adversary sends the fabricated AS REQ∗ message
to KDC (see entry 6). Since this message is identical to a genuine message from
Alice, the KDC accepts and establishes the session key K20,200 (see entry 7).
In entry 8, the adversary forces his guess of this session key into the transcript
2The following proofs can also be performed in the standard model, by assuming the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard, and assuming that the function F represents
a randomly selected function from a family of pair-wise independent hash functions (see [27,




3. (Implementation, accessSC, 10, signedData,
signature)
4. (AccessSC, 10)
5. (InitUserInstance, 20, 200, 0,Alice)
6. (Implementation, deliverMsg, 20, 200,
signedData||signature, msgFromKDC, accept)
7. (Start, 20, 200)
8. (Application, print “guess”, guess)
9. (Application, dump keys, {K20,200})
Figure 2: Example of a real world transcript without an indistinguishable ideal
world equivalent
and then it asks the ring master to dump all established keys to the transcript.
This results in the single established key K20,200 to be written in entry 9.
We now describe a distinguisher that is able to determine, with non-negligible
probability, whether a transcript of the above form originates from the real or
the ideal world. The distinguisher simply indicates ‘real world’ if and only if the
value of guess in entry 8 equals the session key Ki,j reported in entry 9. This
distinguisher is actually correct except with negligible probability. In order to
see this, observe that, as explained in Section 4.1, the real world adversary
knows the session key established by the KDC’s instance. Therefore, with cer-
tainty, it holds that guess = Ki,j . There exist only two potential approaches to
construct an ideal world transcript of this form where guess = Ki,j holds; the
first approach is by random guessing and this approach works with negligible
probability. The other approach is to compromise the KDC’s instance. Issuing
a Start(20, 200, compromise, key) query such that a (Start, 20, 200) entry appears
on position 8 in the transcript. This is, however, impossible for the ideal world
adversary because this query is rejected unless either (a) the user identifier ‘Al-
ice’ is not assigned to any user, or (b) Alice’s smart card is accessed after the
instance I20,200, or any of its compatible instances, is initialized, and neither of
these is true in this transcript.
Theorem 2. The modified PKINIT key exchange with smart cards is secure
in the random oracle model, assuming that the Computational Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) problem is hard with a security parameter kd, the signature scheme is
unforgeable with a security parameter ks, signing keys exist only on smart cards,
and nonces3 are sufficiently long and random with a security parameter kn.
3It is, however, important to note that while the security parameters ks and kd are con-
trolled by the user of the protocol by selecting longer key sizes and DH groups, the lengths of
nonces are fixed to 32-bits.
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Before proceeding with the proof, we restate the definition of the modified
PKINIT protocol.
Ui′ → Ui : n0
Ui → Ui′ : τ, IDServer, n1, n2, g, p, , g
x,
certi, sigi(τ, n0, n1, n2, g, p, g
x, IDi′)
Ui′ → Ui : g
y, IDi, certi′ , sigi′(IDi, g
x, gy, n1),
{n2, IDServer,KServer}K
Proof. We describe a simulator that transforms any real-world adversary into an
ideal-world adversary such that no distinguisher has non-negligible advantage
in determining whether a transcript originates from the interaction of the real-
world adversary or our simulator.
Our simulator simulates real-world users and protocol instances towards the
real-world adversary, and responds to queries of the form InitUser, Register,
InitUserInstance, DeliverMessage, AccessSC and Application correspondingly.
Towards the ideal-world ring master, our simulator behaves as follows. InitUser,
Register, InitUserInstance, AccessSC, and Application queries are forwarded to
the ideal-world ring master without the superfluous parameters. Register(·, ·, ·)
queries are forwarded as (Implementation, register, ·, ·, response) queries, where
response is generated by our simulator. DeliverMessage queries are forwarded
as (Implementation, deliverMsg, i, ·, inMsg, outMsg, τ) queries, where inMsg de-
notes the real-world adversary’s message, and outMsg and τ denote the response
message and status generated by the simulator’s simulation of user Ui, respec-
tively. Moreover, if an (Abort, i, j) entry appears in the real-world transcript,
our simulator issues an Abort(i, j) query in the ideal world.
In order to cause the appearance of (Start, i, j) entries in the correct positions
of the ideal-world transcript while ensuring that the sets of established session
keys remain computationally indistinguishable in both worlds (this requirement
is important because otherwise a distinguisher can gain an advantage by ex-
amining the output of Application queries), our simulator proceeds as follows.
Suppose a (Start, i, j) entry appears on the real-world transcript, indicating that
instance Ii,j just received the last message it expected, accepted, and established
a session key.
Case A: If Ii,j ’s partner identifier PID does not correspond to an initialized user
(if this holds in the real world transcript, it does so in the ideal world transcript
as well), then our simulator issues a Start(i, j, compromise, key) query, where key
is the actual key established by Ii,j in the real world. Note that this query results
in the required (Start, i, j) transcript entry. Moreover, it ensures that the key
established by Ii,j in the ideal world is identical to its real-world counterpart.
Case B: Otherwise, i.e., if there exists an (InitUser, i′, ID′) entry in the tran-
script such that ID′ = PID, then our simulator checks whether or not there
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exists an (AccessSC, i′) entry in the transcript after the (InitUserInstance, i, j,
role,PID) entry.
Case B.1: If such an entry exists, then our simulator issues a Start(i, j, compromise,
key) query, where key is the actual key established by Ii,j in the real world. this
query results in the required (Start, i, j) transcript entry. In effect, this means
that the real-world adversary accessed the smart card after n0 was generated
and sent and thus is able to compromise the session.
Case B.2: Otherwise, i.e., if such an (AccessSC, i′) entry does not exist, then
observe that, at least one instance Ii′,j′ that is compatible with Ii,j exists, except
with negligible probability. That is, the nonce n0 was sent before any “mali-
cious” AccessSC by the adversary and the values n1, g
x, gy and the ID match.
This follows from the structure of modified PKINIT, the assumption that the
signature scheme is unforgeable, and the assumption that nonces are sufficiently
long. Our simulator checks whether or not there exists an (AccessSC, i′) entry
in the transcript after the (InitUserInstance, i′, j′, role′,PID′) entry that cor-
responds to the first compatible peer instance Ii′,j′ .
Case B.2.1: If such an entry exists, then our simulator issues a Start(i, j, compromise, key)
query, where key is the actual key established by Ii,j in the real world. This
results in the required (Start, i, j) transcript entry.
Case B.2.2: Otherwise, i.e., if such an (AccessSC, i′) entry does not exist, then
our simulator checks whether or not at least one of Ii,j ’s compatible instances
has accepted (and therefore are isolated in the ideal world).
Case B.2.2.1: If none of the compatible instances has accepted, then our simu-
lator issues a Start(i, j, create) query. As a result, a random key Ki,j is assigned
to Ii,j in the ideal world. Although this key is almost certainly not identical to
its real world counterpart, it is computationally indistinguishable from it in the
random oracle model (see section 5.3.3 in [27]).4
Case B.2.2.2: If at least one of the compatible instances has accepted, then our
simulator selects one of these real world instances, denoted Ii′,j′ , by extracting
the keys from all of them, and comparing it to the key established by Ii,j . If
a match is found, then it issues a Start(i, j, connect(i′, j′)) query. Note that
this results in the required (Start, i, j) transcript entry, and causes the keys
Ki,j and Ki′,j′ to be identical in the ideal world, just as they are in the real
world. Our simulator therefore preserves the computational indistinguishability
of the key sets and hence the transcripts. Note that, except with negligible
probability, our simulator can always find a matching peer isolated instance and
that this instance is unique. This follows from the construction of the PKINIT
4In the original PKINIT protocol, this assertion does not hold. In particular, using the
attack described in Section 4.1, an adversary can cause Ii,j to establish a key that is distin-
guishable from a random one; more precisely, the adversary knows the exact value of that key,
as shown in Theorem 1. Moreover, since this adversary does not issue an AccessSC(i′) query
after the (InitUser, i′, ID), our simulator cannot simulate this adversary as this would require
issuing an illegal compromise query.
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protocol, the assumed security of the signatures, and assuming that nonces are
sufficiently long. If, for example, the adversary had illegitimately accessed the
peer’s smart card, then its AccessSC(i′, ·) queries must have been issued before
the InitUserInstance(i′, j′, role′,PID′) query because otherwise our simulator
would have branched to Case B.2.1. Hence, except with negligible probability,
the adversary must have faithfully forwarded protocol messages between Ii,j
and Ii′,j′ and that, as a result, their keys Ki,j and Ki′,j′ are identical.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we extended Shoup’s security model to include threats in the smart
card setting, and examined the DH variant of the public key Kerberos protocol
(PKINIT) in the new model. The new model incorporates smart card threats
such as temporary access and terminal tampering, and is shown to capture the
attack described in [19]. Furthermore, we show that our proposed fix for the
PKINIT protocol is secure in that model.
The new model’s applicability is not restricted to the Kerberos protocol and
applies to any protocol that can be expressed in Shoup’s model [27]. Given the
broad scope, and also the simplicity behind the original model, we believe that
the smart card version of the model would be a practical tool that can be used
to verify other real world smart card-based protocols.
What the proof of security of the modified PKINIT protocol achieves, is to
transform the intuition of security in the smart card setting due to the additional
nonce, to a formal assurance of security. On the other hand, a formal assurance
of security may not constitute a sufficient reason to introduce a protocol change,
which is not trivial to deploy. We believe, however, that given the fact that
main use-case of the PKINIT protocol in Microsoft Windows Active Directory
is in combination with smart cards, the modification is a reasonable trade-off
to ensure security in the smart card setting.
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